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Abstract
The aim of this text is to make sense of the emerging political-institutional, territorial, 
and socio-ecological dynamics and contradictions of neo-extractivism in Latin America in 
the context of global capitalist development. In contrast to some existing literature, we 
argue that the term ‘neo-extractivism’ should not be restricted to countries with progressive 
governments but be applied to all Latin American societies that, since the 1970s and especially 
since the year 2000, depend predominantly on the exploitation and exportation of nature. 
We argue that the often vague usage of the term neo-extractivism can be strengthened when 
it is seen in line with dominant development models. Therefore, we refer to regulation 
theory and its historical heuristic of different phases of capitalist development. This enables 
us to look at the temporal-spatial interdependencies between shifting socio-economic 
and technological developments, world market structures, and political-institutional 
configurations that characterize neo-extractivism across scales and beyond national borders. 
Keywordss: Capitalism, Development, Extractivism, Neo-extractivism, Latin America, Regulation, 
Resource-based.
Resumen
El objetivo de este texto es darle sentido a las dinámicas y contradicciones político-
institucionales, territoriales y socio-ecológicas del extractivismo en América Latina en 
el contexto del desarrollo capitalista global. Nos referimos a recientes controversias 
latinoamericanas acerca del desarrollo basado en recursos llamados “extractivismo” y 
“neo-extractivismo”. Contra una parte de la literatura, argumentamos que el término “neo-
extractivismo” no debería aplicarse solo a los países con gobiernos progresistas, sino a todos 
los países de América Latina desde la década de los setenta, y especialmente desde el año 
2000. Además, argumentamos que el uso del término neo-extractivismo puede cobrar fuerza 
cuando se mira en línea con modelos de desarrollo dominantes. Para ello, nos referimos a la 
teoría de la regulación y su heurística histórica de las fases del desarrollo capitalista. Esto 
permite mirar las interdependencias espacio-temporales entre desarrollos socioeconómicos 
y tecnológicos cambiantes, estructuras del mercado mundial y configuraciones político-
institucionales que caracterizan el neoextractivismo más allá de escalas y fronteras.
Palabras clave: América Latina, capitalismo desarrollo, extractivismo, modelo, neo-extractivismo, 
regulación.
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1. Introduction
The societal, political, ecological, and developmental implications of 
the twenty-first century commodity boom have been much debated, es-
pecially with reference to Latin America (Gudynas, 2009, 2015; Svampa, 
2012; Lang and Mokrani, 2013; Veltmeyer, 2013; Burchardt and Dietz, 
2014; Prada, 2014; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). This is hardly surprising, 
since the global boom of primary commodities has had a particular in-
fluence on development policies, growth rates, and the intensification 
of resource extraction for export purposes in the Latin American re-
gion. Similar implications of the resource boom can also be observed 
in other world regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia 
(Davenport, 2013; Hilson et al., 2013; Verbrugge et al. 2015). Between the 
years 2000 and 2010, national economies in Latin America grew at an av-
erage rate of five per cent per year. This wealth in raw materials became 
a key driver of growth and a central source of state revenue in the region. 
This was reflected in growing foreign exchange revenues, a mounting 
share of the primary sector in gross domestic product (GDP), and an ac-
celeration of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the resource extraction 
and primary commodities sector, especially mining (CEPALSTAT, n.d.; 
Matthes, 2012; Bebbington and Bury, 2013). National governments, espe-
cially those with a left-liberal and further left orientation, were thereby 
granted new room for maneuver in social policies. Thus the distribution 
of additional revenues gained from the resource sector allowed poverty 
rates to be lowered and persistent social inequalities reduced (this was 
particularly the case in Venezuela). 
But from 2011 on, and especially in the second half of 2014, the prices 
not only of oil but of all commodities, including minerals and agrar-
ian export crops like soy, declined drastically. According to the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), while metal prices 
fell by 39% and cash crop prices by 29% between 2011 and May 2015, en-
ergy products like oil, natural gas, and coal went down by 52% in only 
seven months between July 2014 and January 2015 (ECLAC, 2015). The 
reasons for this latter dramatic price collapse are attributed to dimin-
ished demand, especially due to the slowing of the Chinese economy, 
increased production, related most importantly to the irruption of the 
US into the oil and gas market through fracking, but also speculative 
factors due to the increasing financialization of commodities. Although 
the impact of this crisis on each national economy has varied, it can be 
said that it led to economic deceleration in the whole Latin American 
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region and in some cases even to recession. Governments have tried to 
limit these effects by increasing tax revenues, fostering the expansion 
of the extractive frontier, and increasing the absolute export volumes of 
commodities (ECLAC, 2015; Svampa, 2016).
Much has been said, debated, and written in relation to neo-extractiv-
ism in Latin America. So why another article on the topic? Starting from 
the existing academic and political debates on the issue, the purpose of 
our paper is twofold. First, by applying insights from regulation theo-
ry, we aim to develop a theoretically founded understanding of neo-ex-
tractivism by characterizing it as a development model. By development 
model, we understand a more or less territorially defined unit, with-
in which a determined set of cultural and social practices and mental 
schemes become (at least partially) hegemonic and translate into an in-
stitutionalized compromise on the national or sub-national scale. Thus a 
development model is the complementary combination of a more or less 
stable regime of accumulation, an industrial/development paradigm, 
and a mode of regulation that underpins the former two institutionally. 
Furthermore, this conducive combination can be seen as the unexpect-
ed result of mass social struggles and movements (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 
1990; Atzmüller et al., 2013). 
Second, we aim to evaluate the current political-institutional, territo-
rial, and socio-ecological dynamics and contradictions of neo-extractiv-
ism in Latin America, not only at the national or sub-national scale, i.e. 
within the boundaries of the nation state, but in the context of dynamic 
global capitalist development. This argument is related to the first in the 
sense that neo-extractivism as a development model needs to be placed 
in its global context. Our line of argument is not world market determin-
istic; in other words, we do not assume that neo-extractivism as a devel-
opment model is merely an expression of international economic and 
political conditions. Rather, we address the interdependencies between 
changing conditions of capitalist accumulation in times of crisis on a 
global scale and through processes of socio-political and socio-ecologi-
cal restructuring at national and local scales.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we review 
the scholarly and political debate concerning neo-extractivism in and 
related to Latin America and present key figures who point to a trend 
towards the consolidation of neo-extractivism in the region. 
In section 3, we present the theoretical framework of the analysis, 
which is based on insights from regulation theory. In sections 4 and 5, 
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we examine various historical phases of extractivism in Latin America. 
The historical analysis reveals the particular temporal-spatial interde-
pendencies with respect to political-institutional configurations, social 
relations of power, and societal-nature relations. Moreover, it helps to 
historically situate neo-extractivism in the current phase of globalizing 
capitalism. In section 6, we focus on important political consequences 
and recent institutional changes, in particular the new constitutions in 
the Andean countries and the weakening of the state apparatuses con-
cerned with environmental issues. In the final part, on the basis of se-
lected indicators and structural socio-political changes, we show that 
the global crisis aside, neo-extractivism has become a consolidating de-
velopment model in some Latin American countries, even if differences 
between countries and sub-regions need to be ascertained and taken 
into account.
2. ‘Classical’ extractivism and neo-extractivism 
in Latin America – debate and evidence
The terms extractivism and neo-extractivism are closely linked to 
the critique of the resurgence of a capitalist-dominated economic and 
growth model oriented toward the extraction and export of raw materi-
als, one that has been pursued in many Latin American countries since 
the turn of the millennium. Authors like Eduardo Gudynas, Alberto 
Acosta, and Maristella Svampa use the concept of extractivism to refer 
to the predominance of economic activities that are primarily based on 
resource extraction and nature valorization without distributive poli-
tics, while the term neo-extractivism is linked to those national gov-
ernments that use the surplus revenue from extractive activities to fight 
poverty and enhance the material well-being of the masses (Gudynas, 
2009; Svampa, 2012; Acosta, 2013).
Classical vs. neo-extractivism in current debates
Extractivism in general is understood both as an accumulation strat-
egy and in terms of the economic structures related to it, “based on the 
overexploitation of […] natural resources, as well as the expansion of cap-
ital’s frontiers toward territories previously considered nonproductive” 
(Svampa, 2015, p. 66). Additional key features linked to neo-extractivism 
are the partial rejection of neoliberal policies, the partial nationaliza-
tion of certain raw material industries (oil, gas, mining), stronger po-
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litical control of resource appropriation and profits, and the expansion 
of socio-political programs. Examples of this ‘post-neoliberal’ form of 
extractivism are to be found both with respect to recent developments 
in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay under left-liberal governments, and 
also in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela ruled by governments which are 
considerably further left. This ‘new’ extractivism is defined in the Latin 
American debate as distinct from ‘classical’ or ‘conservative’ extractiv-
ism, which is characterized by the perpetuation of neoliberal policy 
patterns such as transnationalization, deregulation, and privatization. 
Mexico and Colombia are seen as prime examples of this latter model 
(Gudynas, 2013; 2015). Gudynas (2015) also stresses that conservative ex-
tractivism seeks to build legitimacy in terms of corporate social respon-
sibility, while progressive neo-extractivism achieves this on the basis 
of nationalist or anti-imperialist discourse, arguing that the extractive 
activities are of the people and for the people. 
Svampa (2012) links both versions, i.e. classical extractivism and 
neo-extractivism, with the corresponding models of liberal and progres-
sive developmentalism respectively, and argues that neo-extractivism is 
based on a national-populist socio-political dispositif that strategically 
functions as a source of political legitimization. In other words, as an 
integral part of the development model, neo-extractivism is the justifica-
tion for the exploitation of nature as a project that aims to promote na-
tional development, sovereignty, and social redistribution. Particularly 
in the countries of the Andean region ruled by leftist governments – 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela – the extraction of raw materials is so-
cio-politically justified by the necessity to struggle against poverty and 
social inequality (Correa, 2012; Gudynas, 2014). 
In our understanding, the distinction between progressive and liber-
al/classical extractivism, or between “neo” and “classical” extractivism, 
lies at the level of concrete societal historical formations, that is, con-
crete countries in specific moments. Especially when considering these 
formations in depth (which we do not intend to do here), one should 
take this differentiation as a point of departure. Nonetheless, we would 
like to emphasize that in spite of the fact that differences certainly do ex-
ist, commonalities among the different countries are becoming increas-
ingly visible. These are related to the political practice of nature appro-
priation and the importance of international constellations (Bebbington 
Humphreys and Bebbington, 2012; Gudynas, 2014). On this basis, we 
would like to caution against overestimating the differences between 
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countries due to their forms of government when analyzing extractiv-
ism/neo-extractivism. In the remainder of the paper, we deliberately 
talk only of neo-extractivism, referring to a development model that is 
embedded in a specific historical phase of capitalist development where 
nature and its valuation in the world market play a decisive role for the 
realization of exchange value, and which exhibits commonalities across 
different political regimes.
Extractivism in Latin America in figures
Several commonalities between different Latin American countries, 
notwithstanding the political orientation of their governments, become 
visible when one focuses on macro-economic tendencies. In 2011, ECLAC 
observed the tendency toward a regression or return to primary goods 
production, representing the reprimarization of many national econo-
mies (ECLAC, 2011d). This export-based raw materials boom is particular-
ly marked in the Andean region, but even in the MERCOSUR countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay), the share of raw materials in 
overall exports rose. This reprimarization thesis is, however, based not 
only on the increase in export values resulting from a rise in prices. A 
glance at absolute extraction and production volumes in several coun-
tries also shows a clear tendency of a move toward an extraction econ-
omy: in Bolivia, gas production tripled in quantity between 2000 and 
2008; while petroleum production in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, 
and Venezuela rose by between 50 and 100 per cent between 1990 and 
2008. The growth in extraction and production quantities in mining is 
also notable in Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The expansion of mining in coun-
tries in which it has not traditionally been a sector, such as Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Ecuador, is a particularly important indicator of 
the change in the political and economic constellation of neo-extractiv-
ism (ECLAC, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2012a; 2013; 2014). 
Hence what is at issue here is that before the downturn of commod-
ity prices in 2014, it was not only the price-driven growth in the mon-
etary value of primary products for export that caused the raw materi-
als boom in Latin America; the quantitative growth in the extraction of 
strategic raw materials also pointed to the expansion of an extractive 
model of growth in Latin America. If, moreover, we connect the export 
values and absolute extraction or production volumes with GDP, and 
even when taking into account locally-specific developments, we see an 
overall trend toward extraction economies. Thus the share of the pri-
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mary sector in the GDP of Venezuela in 2011 was 32,3% compared with 
21,9% in 2000; similar trends can be observed in Argentina and Bolivia 
(CEPALSTAT). While in 1998, oil represented 68,7% of total Venezuelan 
exports, in recent years this share rose to 96% (Lander, 2014a). In Ecuador 
in 2013, 80,8% of all exports corresponded to the primary sector, while 
the share of manufactured exports had fallen by 11% since 2012 (Luna 
Osorio, 2013).
In some countries of the region such as Bolivia and Venezuela, the 
high share of raw material revenues in the state budget indicates the 
consolidation of this development model. Other examples include Chile, 
where the share of raw material-based revenues in the state budget rose 
from 28% to 34% between 1990 and 2008; Colombia saw a rise from 8% to 
18%; and Mexico from 30% to 37% (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014). Overall, the 
calculation was that raw material extraction provided an economic base, 
by means of which increasing growth and –under certain political con-
ditions distribution could be achieved; even in times of global economic 
and financial crisis. At the same time, there has been a marked reduction 
in poverty in the region, including extreme poverty, which dropped from 
almost 44% in 1999 to below 31% in 2010 (ECLAC, 2012b). Nevertheless, 19% 
of the overall Latin American population was dependent on government 
assistance and social programs (Svampa, 2014), a situation that could eas-
ily reverse the trend toward poverty reduction in the case of a substantial 
drop in the world market prices for raw materials.
It would seem that Latin America’s veins were open once again, to 
use the famous metaphor of the Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano 
(1997), but this time, at least in some respects, positively and under dif-
ferent conditions. This time, the ‘blood’ was not flowing exclusively 
to benefit the domestic or comprador bourgeoisie, the balance sheets of 
transnational corporations, or for the maintenance and intensification 
of the imperial mode of living of those in the global North. Rather, in 
many countries, it also flowed to benefit other strata of the population, 
addressing urgent social issues and stabilizing ever more precarious 
state budgets. This seems to be the case particularly in countries with 
so-called progressive governments in power, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, 
and Ecuador, where in recent years post-neoliberal state interventions 
have taken the form of the partial nationalization of raw materials, high 
levels of profit taking from raw material production, the imposition of 
export taxes, and the establishment of certain social programs, to name 
the most important measures. 
 11 (21) 2016 • PP. 125-159 133
NEO-EXTRACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA. ONE SIDE OF A NEW PHASE...
Despite these important achievements, critical and skeptical po-
sitions have gained momentum over the past years. This critique has 
mainly been directed toward the spatial and temporal externalization of 
the social and ecological costs of this development model, the re-central-
ization of political power, and a disregard for social, territorial, and po-
litical rights (Haarstad, 2012). With reference to the various practices of 
extraction (especially mining, agro-industry, fossil fuel extraction), crit-
ics have pointed to the territorial transformation processes that result in 
the restructuring of landscapes and social and labor relations, as well as 
spatial fragmentation. Specific to such processes are the drawing of new 
territorial boundaries and enclosures, the emergence of enclave econo-
mies, the imposition of exclusive use rights, the de-democratization of 
the use of nature, and wide ranging ecological destruction. The critique 
has also taken aim at the unbroken Western belief in progress and at 
the growth paradigm associated with it. Another more recent strand of 
critique focuses on the poverty reduction strategies themselves. Lavinas 
(2013) stated that while in the 1980s and 1990s microcredit schemes were 
the dominant anti-poverty tool in Latin America (with moderate results), 
since the turn of the century conditional cash transfer programs have 
moved to the fore: 
[…] by providing select groups of the poor with cash or new modalities 
of bank credit rather than decommodified public goods or services, they 
are also a powerful instrument for drawing broad strata of the popula-
tion into the embrace of financial markets. (Lavinas, 2013, p. 7) 
In our view, the strength of the critical Latin American debate is that 
it sees neo-extractivism as an economic model that is secured by the 
state, cultural norms, class relations, and particular societal-nature re-
lations. It is based on and reinforces a subaltern integration into the 
world market and authoritarian politics.1 Moreover, the societal-nature 
relations upon which the model is based, as well as its considerable so-
cio-ecological problems and effects, are being politicized as a result of 
these discussions. At issue is not a broad-brush rejection of any form of 
societal use or appropriation of nature, but rather the domination-ori-
1 By adopting such a perspective, we do not overlook the fact that an additional driv-
ing force of capitalist economic growth can be the development of the internal mar-
ket and the increasing consumption of the middle and upper classes in particular 
(Jäger et al., 2014).
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ented content of this appropriation for the capitalist world market, 
which is destructive of both nature and social structures (Gudynas, 
2009; 2014; Colectivo Voces de Alerta, 2011; Svampa, 2012; Acosta, 2013; 
Lang and Mokrani, 2013).
3. Theorizing extractivism as a development 
model using regulation theory 
As we argued above, we see a certain conceptual and theoretical 
weakness in putting the neo-extractivist economic model into a broad-
er context. This weakness is also reflected in critical accounts from the 
region itself. Machado Aráoz states that understanding extractivism 
mainly as a national development strategy lacks consistency because 
“it focuses on the social formations where these activities are carried 
out, omitting and disregarding the world system, the rules governing 
the rate and rhythm of extraction, the uses of these resources and the 
technology applied” (Machado Aráoz, 2015, p. 4, as cited in Martín, 2016). 
Along the same lines, Moreno (2015) questions a state-centered perspec-
tive on extractivism, which ignores the real dynamics of a globalized 
world increasingly dominated by China’s resource hunger. She therefore 
argues that extractive activities are neither disconnected from industri-
al production processes and technological innovations, nor are the latter 
disconnected from the availability of natural resources (Martín, 2016). 
Taking these critiques as a starting point, we propose to understand 
neo-extractivism as a development model, referring here to insights 
from regulation theory. This approach claims that historically speaking, 
contradictory capitalist relations –including societal-nature relations 
have taken very different forms due to technological, socio-economic, 
cultural, and political developments, and the contingent results of social 
struggles. These manifold relations can be temporarily stabilized, and 
will thus create the societal context for a relatively permanent process 
of capital accumulation. Such a temporal stabilization is called a ‘mode 
of development’, referring to a particular articulation of a regime of ac-
cumulation, mode of regulation, and technological paradigm (Aglietta, 
1979; Lipietz, 1988; Boyer, 1990; Hirsch, 1997; Alnasseri et al., 2001; Becker, 
2002; Jessop and Sum, 2006; Atzmüller et al., 2013). We use the terms ‘de-
velopment model’ and ‘mode of development’ interchangeably. 
The analytical point of departure of regulation theory is as follows. 
As we have often seen throughout history and as we currently experi-
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ence, capital accumulation can also take place under unstable condi-
tions and in periods of crisis. However, socio-economic structures and 
processes work better when certain regularities exist; concerning social 
structures like class or gender, compromises and consent can be better 
achieved under more or less stable conditions. The reproduction of so-
ciety as a whole is continually manifested through the actions of indi-
viduals who pursue entirely different strategies and have very different 
allocative and authoritative resources available to them. For this reason, 
the reproduction of society remains a precarious process, although the 
ability to plan and handle dynamics may develop through the temporar-
ily firm establishment of social relations.
Marxist theory focuses at the abstract level on the capitalist mode 
of production, and at the concrete level on social formations (usually 
national societies). The invention of regulation theory was intended to 
introduce a middle range level of abstraction in order to identify dif-
ferent, more or less stable, phases across different formations since the 
emergence of capitalism: i.e. modes of development such as Fordism. 
The concept of mode of development considers more –and historically 
concrete elements such as mass production and mass consumption than 
the more abstract term mode of production. 
Macro-economic coherence –a functioning regime of accumulation 
that in peripheral countries is always highly dependent on the concrete 
forms of world market integration, is institutionally embedded through 
a mode of regulation. This encompasses “the totality of institutional 
forms, networks, and explicit or implicit norms assuring the compati-
bility of behaviors within the framework of a regime of accumulation 
in conformity with the state of social relations and hence with their 
conflictual character” (Lipietz, 1988, p. 24). This stabilization occurs via 
broadly shared societal values and the temporary institutionalization 
of societal relations in the form of modes of regulation. Boyer (1990, 
pp. 42ff.) describes the characteristics of modes of regulation: they se-
cure the reproduction of fundamental societal relationships across all 
concrete manifestations of institutional forms; they ‘steer’ the reproduc-
tion of the particular regime of accumulation; and finally, they guar-
antee the dynamic compatibility of a wide range of decentralized de-
cision-making processes by individuals or institutions without having 
to take the logic of the entire system into account. The relative perma-
nence of societal relations means not only the reinforcement of institu-
tions but also the stabilization of the expectations and life practices of 
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individuals, as well as of collective actors such as trade unions. In this 
sense, a functioning development model tends to be abler to create so-
cio-economic and political hegemony in the sense of Antonio Gramsci, 
i.e. to elucidate the complex mechanisms of “the agreement of associ-
ated societal wills” (Gramsci, 1991, pp. 1536ff.). Hegemony in this sense 
refers to domination-shaped consent based on the material core, i.e. a 
more or less functioning capitalist political economy, and the ability 
and willingness of the dominating classes to compromise. 
Gramsci’s concept is useful because it aims precisely to detect the 
universalized (not homogenized) socio-economic, political, and ide-
ational patterns and mechanisms of domination. This brings us to an 
important point that needs to be considered in a global perspective on 
the (neo) extractivist development model, namely that the capitalist reg-
ulation of societal-nature relations does not mean the abolition of ten-
dentially destructive forms of the appropriation of nature; nevertheless, 
the destruction of nature will not necessarily become an urgent problem 
for overall capitalist development, since dangerous negative impacts can 
be spatially externalized and temporarily postponed. We can observe 
this quite clearly in Latin America and at an international scale.
Finally, a strength of regulation theory is its perspective on deeply 
embedded structural features, their variation throughout history, and 
their inter-linkages with accumulation strategies and manifold other so-
cial actions. Therefore, methodologically, regulation theory looks both 
at different phases of capitalist development with particular features, 
but also at continuities with previous phases, i.e. it attempts to highlight 
the continuities and discontinuities, moments of – spatially highly un-
even stabilization and crises.
4. Extractivism in Latin America’s history
The history of Latin America is inseparably linked to raw-materials ex-
traction. At each point in history, the historically specific forms of nature 
appropriation were constitutive for the modes of socio-economic repro-
duction and power relations. In Latin America, various historical phases of 
extractivism can be identified, based on specific world-market structures, 
supporting political economic and power relations, specific development 
conceptions and effects on social inclusion and exclusion as well as specif-
ic discursive rationalities. In the following we distinguish four historical 
phases: colonial extractivism, the extractivism of the liberal capitalism of 
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the 19th century, peripheral-Fordist extractivism, and the current phase of 
neo-extractivism. The latter will be addressed in section 4.
The colonial extractivism of the 16th to 18th centuries
The phase of colonial extractivism extends from the conquista to the 
independence of the colonial countries in the early 19th century. The key 
constitutive and interrelated characteristics of this phase are the forced 
appropriation of precious metals, especially gold and silver, and of land 
areas, and the establishment of a specific colonial system of domination. 
The dominant societal form and practice of extractivism during this phase 
based on a social classification along the category of race that not only di-
vided humans themselves and justified factually unfree labor, that is to 
say slavery, but created also a societal relation with nature that subjugat-
ed it exclusively for human necessities. During the colonial period Latin 
America became one of the world’s most important suppliers of raw mate-
rials for the industrializing European countries and their idea of moder-
nity, i.e. it was a precondition for a colonial regime of accumulation. The 
export of raw materials from Latin America was driven by the growing 
power of international commercial capital and the soaring growth rates 
of worldwide economic output.2 The phase of colonial extractivism must 
therefore be seen as the other, i.e. the dark side of European capitalism 
(Coronil, 2000; De Sousa Santos, 2008). Colonial extractivism was the ba-
sis, on the one hand, of a plundering economy within the Latin American 
countries, and, on the other hand, of a global division of labour which 
has remained structurally effective to this day, and which has triggered 
heterogeneous socio-spatial structural effects domestically. The mode of 
regulation consisted of the political dependence from the centers, of the 
complete subordination under their economic necessities and of racism 
and a strong role of the Catholic Church. The phase was characterized by 
instability and the constant valorization and de-valorization of regions 
depending on the particular commodities that existed there, the ability 
to extract them, as well as on the demand from outside. 
The extractivism of liberal capitalism (1810 to approx. 1930)
The second phase of extractivism coincides with the independence 
of the Latin American countries, “The Age of Capital” (Hobsbawm, 1975), 
the increasing importance of foreign capital and a wave of internal col-
2 Between 1700 and 1820, world economic output almost doubled (Maddison, 2002).
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onization processes. With the economic boom in the capitalist centers, 
the world market expanded under the leadership of Great Britain, and a 
world order known as the “Pax Britannica” was established (Cox, 1987). 
Starting in the mid-19th century, a “neo-colonial order” (Donghi, 1993) 
emerged. Under this order, Latin America developed into one of the most 
economically prosperous regions of the era, with some characteristics 
of a stable development model, thanks to the continuation of the co-
lonial raw-materials regime of accumulation. The dominant free-trade 
policies seemed to work, and contributed –albeit not everywhere to the 
capitalist penetration of Latin America. Based on such models as prog-
ress and stability, the neo-colonial order developed a strongly structured 
forcefulness, with oligarchic democratic systems ensuring the promo-
tion of the system of raw-materials extraction dominated by free trade. 
Moreover, initial welfare-state programs helped to coopt the burgeoning 
working class into the political system, and thus to reinforce the politi-
cal-economic order internally (Kurtenbach und Wehr, 2014).
The discontinuities with respect to the previous phase involved the 
fact that Latin America now itself became an importer not only of con-
sumer goods, but also of such capital goods as machines. The capital im-
ports led to a technological modernization of the extraction sector, and 
the participation of international capital contributed to the direct con-
nection with the international financial system. In some countries, this 
favored the rise of a so-called “comprador” bourgeoisie, for which the so-
called “Bolivian tin barons” were the quintessential model. With the pri-
vate accumulation of raw-material revenues, the members of this class 
achieved such political and economic influence that in some cases literal 
‘extraction states’ emerged, with the goal of implementing the interests of 
this group within the state. Another power center established within the 
state was that of the large landowning families, whose material power 
base was augmented by internal colonization processes, often involving 
the violent appropriation of indigenous areas and of church lands in order 
to meet the growing demand for raw materials and foodstuffs –sugar, cof-
fee and cereals in the metropolitan centers. This also involved the integra-
tion of new raw materials like saltpeter, guano, rubber and oil.
The extractivism of peripheral Fordism (1930-1970)
The global economic crisis of 1929 went hand in hand with various 
waves of collapses of the world market caused by crises and wars and the 
decline of the neo-colonial order. 
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Since the beginning of industrial capitalism, capitalist, patriarchal, 
and imperial modes of production and living gained certain stability 
and hegemony at the cost of environmental destruction. However, so-
cietal nature relations were stabilized, especially during (peripheral) 
Fordism, due to its environmentally unsustainable character. Manifold 
societal institutions, like the capitalist market and the capitalist state, 
assured certain hegemony of destructive and domination-shaped socie-
tal nature relations (Mitchell, 2009; Brand and Wissen, 2012). The socie-
tal regulation, in the sense of dealing with contradictions, of capitalist 
societal nature relations is possible, and does in fact occur; herein lies a 
central dynamic of politics.
After World War II a peripheral-Fordist development model emerged in 
Latin America. It was characterized by the consolidation of a new world 
order, the “Pax Americana” (Cox, 1987), partial successes at industrializa-
tion, and the emergence of the Latin American development state as well 
as a tendency toward indebtedness which began as early as the 1950s.
There were also internal reasons for such developments: After the 
crisis of 1929 and the declining demand for Latin American export prod-
ucts from the raw-materials sector, a strong wave of economic nation-
alism got the upper hand. The state intervened more strongly in eco-
nomic activities, breaking with the liberal free-trade model of the 19th 
century. Some key industries were nationalized –for example, the oil in-
dustry in Mexico. The new economic-policy paradigm was that of “im-
port-substituting industrialization” (ISI). The construction of domestic 
industries and the support for domestic economic development was 
designed to decrease the dependency on imports and raw-material ex-
ports. In this context, the Latin American development state emerged: 
the state established protective tariffs, transferred income from exports 
to domestic-market-oriented sectors, integrated the interests of the ur-
ban middle and upper classes and those of the working classes (at least 
initially) alike, and often worked against the interests of the agrarian 
oligarchy. The development-policy model was known as desarrollismo 
(developmentalism) with a strong orientation toward economic growth 
and societal progress, which could be called ‘conservative moderniza-
tion’ or ‘catch-up development’. In the current debate, some authors 
refer to the logics of ISI as an option for a post-extractivist, autono-
mous development pathway of the region, particularly with respect to a 
break with the regions’ dependency on imports of manufactured goods 
and raw-material export-orientation (Ugarteche and Valencia, 2016). 
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Although an enhanced processing of raw-materials within the region 
would reduce export orientation, increase the parts of the value chain 
controlled by Latin American state and non-state actors and certainly 
help to diversify the productive bases of the regions’ economies, we 
argue that it would not necessarily lead to overcome neo-extractivism 
as a whole. First, because within the region considerable political-eco-
nomic inequalities and power asymmetries exist. Already today a great 
deal of raw materials from the Andean region is exported to Brazil and 
Argentina. Thus, a regional answer would probably deepen these asym-
metries and reproduce spatial-temporal inequalities –now at a regional 
level. Second, beyond the national state level of analysis, what is im-
portant to take into account is that also under (peripheral) Fordism, 
destructive and domination-shaped societal nature relations prevailed. 
Thus, in order to overcome neo-extractivism, what is necessary is not 
only a break with export-orientation but a radical transformation of 
domination-shaped societal nature relations, within in and beyond na-
tional states and world regions.
However, in spite of continuing growth in the industrial sector and 
some nationalization measures, there was no real break with the de-
velopment model of the preceding phase based on exploitation of raw 
materials. Rather, with the changed constellation of social forces and in 
the context of a growing United States hegemony combined with the po-
litically justified exclusive claim to the strategic resources of the region, 
a specific national popular form of extractivism emerged. One example 
was Venezuela, where a popular nationalist development model based 
on the exploitation of newly discovered petroleum fields for export had 
already become a dominant force during the 1930s, with the promise of 
modernization and progress which was concentrated in the popular slo-
gan of ‘sowing oil’ (Coronil, 1997). 
Starting in the 1960s, ever more contradictions of the ISI model 
emerged: economic growth declined, the wage levels of the working 
class dropped, the tax income that would have been necessary to finance 
state investment dried up, and the promise of political and societal par-
ticipation by the urban under-classes, which had grown enormously as 
a result of country-to-city migration, was abandoned. The indigenous 
population was excluded from the outset from the supposedly positive 
developments of this phase, or else it was to be de-ethnicized and as-
similated into the nation as campesinos or inhabitants of the new urban 
peripheries (Smith, 1996).
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With the crisis of Fordism, the global structure of demand for re-
sources changed, resulting in a crisis of import substitution. The hopes 
for ‘debt-based industrialization’ (Altvater, 1987) remained unfulfilled, 
since the industrial products did not enjoy a high level of demand on 
the world market. Moreover, the loans were largely used for favorable 
consumer loans.
5. Neo-extractivism in the age of  
a global ‘commodity consensus’
The current neo-extractivist development model is, similar to the pe-
ripheral-Fordist phase, one of catch-up development with a supposedly 
“strong state” which assumes both the role both of an entrepreneur and 
of a mediator and also guarantees the basic conditions for raw-material 
extraction and profit accumulation. Simultaneously, it differs from the 
previous phases of capitalist development essentially due to the changed 
altered world economic and political position of natural resources and 
their appropriation by society, shifting roles of the state, specific world 
market constellations, new technologies, and capital valorization strat-
egies (Albritton et al., 2001; Robinson, 2004). Nevertheless, associated 
national and international policies, cultural norms, and dispositifs for 
action are also changing. For the analysis of the influencing factors of 
neo-extractivism, two phases can be distinguished at the general level. 
First is an initial phase, which roughly covers the period from 1970 to 
2000, during which extractivism/neo-extractivism was to a certain ex-
tent prepared as an option. The second ensuing phase coincided with 
the turn of the millennium and is still ongoing.
The neoliberal phase (1970s-2000)
With the neoliberal economic and societal policies that gained the 
upper hand during the 1970s, the previous socio-economic and polit-
ical constellation changed radically. The dominant model was a new 
world market-oriented developmentalism, which by way of the mech-
anisms of debt service and structural adjustment led to the direct im-
pact of the power and volatility of the world market on society. This 
ultimately created the conditions for at least a partial reprimarization 
of Latin American economies. While the participation of Latin America 
in world trade stagnated below the level of 5,5% during the period from 
1980 to 2000, the export shares of certain raw material sectors, particu-
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larly mining, climbed. In the course of overall structural changes, how-
ever, control over raw materials also changed (Bridge, 2008; Emel and 
Huber, 2008). In the mining sector, the importance of transnational cor-
porations increased –in Chile and Peru, for instance while at the same 
time, the so-called multilatinas, such as the former Brazilian state en-
terprise Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, graduated to the ranks of the glob-
al players. In the agricultural sector, a highly industrialized globalized 
production system established itself, accompanied by a transformation 
of the institutions of land use and access distribution, and also of the 
range of actors; landownership was generally liberalized and transna-
tional corporations from Latin America and the global North became 
ever more important (Gras and Hernández, 2014). At the same time, these 
developments aggravated the crisis, as the goal of achieving dynamic 
development through exports and direct investment was not attained. 
Starting in the mid-1990s, neoliberal and increasingly authoritarian con-
stellations and developments were politicized by social movements. The 
most obvious expression was the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994 in 
the south-east of Mexico.
Reprimarization through neo-extractivism (2000 to the present)
The second phase of reprimarization began around 2000, although 
this was not initially obvious. This phase was initiated by the constantly 
rising global demand for agricultural and mineral products, which tend-
ed to improve the real terms of trade between primary and secondary 
commodities. For example, the price of oil rose to over US$140 a barrel in 
2008. Although it dropped again as a result of the global economic crisis, 
its average between 2011 and 2013 was still around US$107, making these 
three years the most expensive oil years in history (InvestmentMine, 
n.d.; for a german chart with year-by-year figures see Tecson, n.d.). Even 
more dramatic price rises could be seen in the area of minerals, met-
als, and ores (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, n.d.). 
Similar developments have been evident in the agricultural sector, which 
were accompanied by an intensification of the agribusiness production 
paradigm based on high energy inputs, which have had serious social and 
ecological impacts (Rockström et al., 2009, pp. 222ff.; OECD-FAO, 2013).
What must be taken into account is the changing structure of the 
world market, characterized by an intensification of fossil fuel-based, 
industrial production and modes of living in the capitalist centers them-
selves, which could be characterized as a deepening and expansion of 
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the imperial mode of living (Brand and Wissen, 2012). At a lower level, 
this also applies to the economically dynamic industrialization model 
in other parts of the capitalist semi-periphery; associated with this is a 
growing demand for consumer goods. By recent estimates, despite all 
savings and efficiency measures, demand for primary fossil fuels will 
rise by almost 45% by 2030 (Maggio and Cacciola, 2009). On top of that, 
we are witnessing the economic rise of a number of emerging markets, 
especially China, which in 2010 used 20% of the world’s fossil fuels, 23% 
of its major agricultural resources, and 40% of its ferrous metals (Roache, 
2012). China is not only the ‘factory of the world’; it is also developing 
a strong middle and upper class and thus seeing the expansion of the 
resource-intensive consumption patterns of these ‘new consumers’, for 
instance for meat, electronic devices, and automobiles, with all the im-
plications this has for the production of feed, mineral raw materials, and 
fossil fuels.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), world trade quadrupled between 1990 and 2008, 
“but South-South trade multiplied more than ten times” (OECD, 2010, p. 
5) and is becoming ever more important in economic policy strategies. 
It should be noted that raw materials account for 90% of Latin America’s 
exports to Asia (ECLAC, 2011d). Foreign direct investments from China 
in the region have increased dramatically, with a large majority of in-
vestments in firms that extract raw materials without processing them. 
China also plays a dominant role in lending money to Latin American 
countries. The strategy is to provide loans that are repayable in oil and 
thus to secure the flow of oil to the country. In the four years leading 
up to 2013, China had lent more than US$59 billion repayable in oil to 
Latin America and the Caribbean; furthermore, more than two-thirds of 
Chinese loans in the region are designated to be repaid in oil (Gallagher 
et al., 2013; Lander, 2014b).
An additional international factor for the increase in resource ex-
tractivism is the shift of ‘dirty’ industries such as aluminum and steel 
production to countries of the global South, as a result of environmen-
tal regulations and/or protests in countries in the global North (Braun, 
2010). After all, even a supposedly sustainable and low carbon ‘green 
economy’ will be unable to get by without the extraction of raw materi-
als (Brand, 2012; Moreno, 2013). The rising demand for raw materials for 
the production of biofuels –particularly oil, sugar cane, and corn pro-
vides a clear indication of this (Dietz et al., 2015). 
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In view of rising prices, growing geo-economic competition, and the 
possible exhaustion of some resources, political strategies to secure re-
sources in the context of the above described world market constella-
tions are gaining significance. The European Union’s raw material ini-
tiative, adopted in 2008 and updated in 2011, and the German govern-
ment’s 2010 raw material strategy, are good examples (EU Commission, 
2008; 2011; BMWi, 2010). China is also formulating policies for this area, 
as the Chinese government strategy for economic policy cooperation in 
exchange for quid pro quos in development policy shows. Moreover, the 
fact that raw materials and their extraction are becoming increasingly 
attractive for financial capital as objects of real or speculative invest-
ment has an effect on current price developments (Clapp, 2014). 
A further condition for the current Latin American raw materials 
boom is the altered significance of politics on the regional scale, com-
pared with the preceding phases. Regional development and integration 
are both a condition for and a result of current development models 
in Latin America, and are manifested both in new cooperative efforts 
and regional agreements, and in regional infrastructure politics encom-
passing the cross-border construction of dams, roads, and ports.3 Thus 
regional infrastructure politics is being used to reorganize and produce 
space and to establish the preconditions for the valorization of nature 
(Zibechi, 2012).
In this context, Svampa (2015) refers to a ‘commodity consensus’, i.e. a 
global constellation in which, in spite of the global politicization of the 
ecological crisis and climate change, the extractivist form of the appropri-
ation of nature has remained the dominant global dynamic. The continu-
ities with respect to the neoliberal Washington consensus are that Latin 
American national economies continue to be integrated into the world 
market in a subordinate position and have few possibilities to design 
their own options in the global political economy. What is new, howev-
er, is that capital valorization is no longer, as in previous decades, carried 
out via privatization, liberalization, the promotion of foreign direct in-
3 The Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure in South America 
(IIRSA) is one example. It involves investment amounting to US$70 billion for more 
than 500 dams, hydroelectric projects, road and port construction projects, as well 
as the expansion of pipelines. A similar strategy for Central America is planned by 
the Proyecto Mesoamericano.
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vestment, and structural adjustment programs, but rather via resource 
extractivism at relatively high world market prices. This is at the core 
of the frequently used term ‘post-neoliberalism’ (Brand and Sekler 2009; 
Svampa, 2012). The current paradoxical situation is that Latin American 
progressive governments achieved their socio-political leeway for action 
–as both a result and an expression of former popular organization and 
mobilization thanks to their continued intensive valorization of nature 
for the world market (Lander, 2012). This led to a major increase in social 
programs and an active state economic policy and created further expec-
tations on the part of the lower and middle socio-economic strata.
6. Socio-political and structural resonances
One of the most important changes in some Latin American countries 
has been the contested formulation and acceptance of new constitutions 
(e.g. in Ecuador and Bolivia) that have stipulated not only wide ranging 
political and social rights and the rights of nature, but also the recog-
nition of cultural difference and the rights of territorial self-definition 
and autonomy. However, the last few years have proved how difficult, 
ambivalent, and disputed their implementation under neo-extractivism 
is (Vega, 2012; Ávila Santamaría, 2014; Castro Patiño, 2014). The politi-
cal presence of indigenous organizations rose the controversial issue of 
neo-extractivist societal-nature relations, while these countries’ consti-
tutions stipulate such principles as ‘living well’ (buen vivir or vivir bien), 
which precisely do not imply an extractivist relationship with nature.
At the same time, the neo-extractivist phase brought about important 
processes of state modernization throughout the continent, which also 
included the creation of legal frameworks, new institutions, and mech-
anisms of democratic control around extractivism (RLIE, 2016). The ma-
jority of Latin American countries, starting with Brazil in 1981, saw the 
creation of high level environmental authorities (ministries in most cas-
es) and environmental protection laws; followed, from 2002 on, by laws 
on transparency and access to public information around extractive ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, these regulations were always contested and on-
ly partly implemented. While information on the volume and value of 
extraction –which demonstrates a government’s success has been made 
publicly accessible, in many countries information on the conditions of 
contracts and concessions is only partial or is difficult to find. The same 
limitations apply to data on the exact destiny of the revenues collected. 
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From 2012 on, a severe setback regarding environmental regulation, 
control, transparency, and democratic, decentralized decision-mak-
ing can be observed. As a response to the decline of commodity prices, 
countries are now engaging in a competition for foreign investment at 
almost any cost and under any conditions. In particular, the stipulation 
for free and informed prior consent around extractive activities, ground-
ed in the ILO Convention 169 and the 2007 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples –although ratified (in Bolivia 2007 
and Ecuador 2012) and written into law in some countries (in Peru 2012, 
according to RLIE, 2016) was weakened or neutralized even before im-
plementation. In Bolivia, Presidential Decree 2195 (2014) has practically 
undone the constitutionally avowed self-determination rights of indige-
nous peoples, and Decree 2366 (2015) allows hydrocarbon exploration in 
protected areas.
Many national environmental institutions as well as control and 
sanction mechanisms against environmental destruction were reshaped 
and weakened, and in some cases disappeared altogether. At the same 
time, the political power of institutions linked to extractivism within 
the State apparatuses, in the form of ministries for mining, energy, or 
agriculture, was strengthened and some of them were associated to pow-
erful ministries like those of finance, industry, or public works, thus 
providing the necessary infrastructure (Gudynas, 2014). In Venezuela, 
the Ministry of Environment was dismantled in early September 2014 
and its functions subordinated to the Ministry of Habitat and Housing. 
In the same year, in Ecuador the Ministry of Environment was placed 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Strategic Sectors, which al-
so coordinates the Ministries for Hydrocarbons and Energy. In Brazil, 
the Brazilian Institute for Environment has been divided into two in-
stitutions, while Uruguay’s president José Mujica has repeatedly asked 
to break up the country’s Ministry of Environment and Housing. 
In Colombia, bypassing the policies of the National Environmental 
Authority, Supreme Decree 041 (2014) introduced ‘express’ environmen-
tal licensing for mining activities, which allows corporations to present 
an environmental management plan and start working without waiting 
for the authorities’ approval (Gudynas, 2014; RLIE, 2016). In this context, 
the classification of land as ‘unused’ or ‘degraded’ represents a discursive 
construct and norm setting combined with the specific goal of valoriza-
tion or appropriation; existing non-commercial uses are seldom if ever 
recognized. In this context, Sacher (2014) underlines the dynamic and so-
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cio-political dimension in the definition of territories that are declared 
suitable for raw material extraction. A case in point for the expansion of 
territories that are politically and socially defined as mineral deposits or 
oil fields is the Yasuní National Park in Ecuador, which in August 2013 
transitioned from a worldwide symbol of environmental and climate 
justice policies to simply an oil field to be exploited, when president 
Rafael Correa announced the end of the ‘leave the oil in the soil’ policy. 
On the other hand, many countries experienced what could be called 
a partial reformulation of class compromises, the core of which is the 
use of high economic growth rates in the primary sector to greatly en-
hance the leeway of governments to distribute wealth. In many coun-
tries, the result was less an expansion of the industrial sector than an 
enhancement of raw material-based revenues, which enabled the imple-
mentation of assistentialist policies. In countries with center-left or left-
ist governments, this has brought millions of people out of hunger and 
has led to a relatively high degree of governmental legitimacy among 
poor people,4 as well as to a political discourse that is both national-pop-
ulist and favorable to Latin American integration. Nevertheless, there is 
some debate regarding the durability and structural character of these 
changes. Some authors observe a significant increase in the continent’s 
middle class, up to a third of the overall population (Ferreira et al., 2013). 
Most clearly in Bolivia, the cooperative miners and the cocaleros, as well 
as other Aymara groups, have experienced important processes of social 
mobility and are now part of the new elites (PIEB, 2013). 
Positions that tend more to emphasize the paradoxical character of 
current developments, while still taking note of the successes of the re-
distribution policies, point out their structural and strategic weakness-
es. On the one hand, there has been no restructuring of the productive 
sector, while on the other, integration into and dependence on the world 
market are proceeding apace. Accordingly, there is growing criticism not 
only of the ecological effects of these policies, but also of the type of 
state distribution policy applied. The latter is criticized for not changing 
societal power relations, so that, for instance, there have been few ini-
tiatives toward land reform. In sum, this model makes no radical break, 
4 The last presidential elections in Brazil in October 2014 showed this quite explicitly. 
The now impeached candidate of the Workers’ Party, Dilma Rousseff, clearly won in 
those regions in the north and north-east where the majority is poor, while she lost 
remarkably in the south where the middle classes are stronger.
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either with modernity’s ethos of progress and development or with tra-
ditional relationships of power and domination (Lavinas, 2013; Gudynas, 
2015, 198ff.).
Aside from these facts, extractivist strategies involve considerable 
intra-societal conflicts, particularly in countries with new constitu-
tions and formerly strong indigenous movements such as Bolivia and 
Ecuador, where governments and state apparatuses are in the throes of 
an enormous dilemma between the postulated decentralization and de-
mocratization on the one hand, and a potentially authoritarian devel-
opment state that embodies the concept of raison d’état on the other 
(Eaton, 2013). The latter is realized within the state and society by means 
of a hierarchical, authoritarian, even militaristic dispositif according to 
which development is to be promoted and society defended against in-
ternal and external enemies: 
Thus there exists a close connection between extractivism and the 
strengthening of centralism and authoritarian tendencies in the political 
realm. A state leadership with unlimited and uncontrolled access to a 
country’s most profitable resources can easily secure the continuation of 
its rule without bothering to deal with autonomous societal forces in an 
equal way, even if it is required to regularly subject itself to free elections. 
(Meschkat, 2013, our translation)
Academic and socio-political assessments of these developments di-
verge. Some take the position that a stronger state and the redistribution 
of income constitute the basis for a shift of power relations in society 
over the medium term, which will clearly favor the broad masses of the 
population and their organizations (García Linera, 2012, pp. 75-80). In 
contrast, recent critiques diagnose a significant concentration of power 
in the executive function and an erosion of the separation of powers, 
namely for Ecuador and Bolivia, as the executive power has gained con-
trol over the legislative, judicial and also electoral power. In both coun-
tries, the popular mass organizations whose struggles brought these 
progressive governments to power have been weakened significantly, 
and critics of the government in office are often prosecuted (Tapia, 2011; 
Basabe and Martínez, 2014). Gudynas (2014, pp. 150-151) also observes a 
loss of democratic mechanisms of deliberation or consultation and a 
tendency towards the exclusion of political minorities throughout the 
region (Prada, 2014).
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Nonetheless, in spite of the important current experiences in Latin 
America indicating that other paths toward development are possible, 
the alternatives to date have all remained within the extractivist corri-
dor; i.e. they represent a form of capitalist modernization that is current-
ly profiting from high world market prices, but which does not change 
the fundamental political, economic, and cultural structural patterns or 
the power relations that support them. 
At the core of many current problems are the contradictions of the in-
dustrial-fossilistic and capitalist mode of production. (Peripheral) Fordist 
forms of mass production and consumption, more or less functioning 
social compromises, and stable welfare institutions became and still are 
a strong and attractive orientation in societies of the global North as 
well as in the global South. In the current state of global economic crisis, 
Fordist patterns are prolonged and partially deepened through an in-
tensification of unsustainable patterns of production and consumption.
7. Conclusion
As we have shown, the characteristic elements of the neo-extractivist 
development model that have emerged since the 1970s, and especially af-
ter 2000, are as follows. First, changing world market constellations and 
growing geopolitical and geo-economic rivalries favor continued high 
demand for natural resources, which in most areas contributed to con-
tinued high world market prices until 2014. Second, the emergence and 
stabilization of resource extractivist practices were clearly dependent 
on specific state action based on institutional and judicial assurance 
and the securing of property and use rights; i.e. the granting of conces-
sions or property titles to land and forest areas and the only partial im-
plementation and subsequent undermining of environmental controls. 
Likewise it depended on the infrastructural enablement and authoriza-
tion of raw material exploitation, extraction, and marketing in the form 
of roads, ports, and pipelines. Such practices were further supported by 
discourse, evident in the debate around the cultivation of raw materials 
for agro fuel production in so-called unused or degraded areas. In coun-
tries with center-left or leftist governments, state-organized distribution 
measures, from which not only the upper socio-economic strata but also 
the lower and especially the middle strata profit, have also contributed 
to social and political stability. Thus it has been possible, despite all the 
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contradictions and conflicts, to create a legitimized base for extractiv-
ism, which formed the foundation for hegemonic social relations, the 
prosperity of which was based primarily on the extraction and sale of 
the products of nature on the world market. Third and finally, the spe-
cific dynamics of neo-extractivism have been marked by new societal 
disputes between the postulated processes of decentralization and de-
mocratization on the one hand, and the tendency toward authoritarian 
state policy patterns on the other. The conflicts here were not only about 
access to the products of nature as the material basis for societal produc-
tion and reproduction or over the revenues obtained from extraction, 
but also about divergent concepts of prosperity, competing worldviews 
and interpretations of nature, political procedures and concepts of order, 
as well as a recognition of identity and territorial self-determination. 
These disputes demonstrate that neo-extractivism is not only an eco-
nomic/technical form of resource appropriation or a renaissance of the 
Latin American economic model, but rather should be seen as a central 
expression of political domination, in which the material, cultural, and 
socio-political dimensions and conflicts of a new development model 
coalesce. Furthermore, these disputes are interesting for the discussion 
of socio-ecological transformation (Brand, 2012; Brand and Wissen, in 
press), a debate that is currently witnessing dynamic development. The 
increasing recognition of ecological problems and the obvious need for 
fundamental transformation –which is stipulated in the constitutions 
of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela stand in contrast to the rather narrow 
political and societal corridors of action. Actors critical of extractivism 
in Latin America intend to promote a discourse and related practices 
that strengthen politics in the broadest sense, namely that of the conflic-
tive and democratic making of society. The focus is thus not on policies 
alone, but also on the societal and political structures and the capitalist, 
patriarchal, and imperial logics upon which they are based. 
An analysis of the neo-extractivist development model that we can 
currently see in Latin America provides an impetus for current develop-
ment politics, and for the socio-political and socio-theoretical challeng-
es that also affect social and political theory. The focus on the global 
context of the complex societal and social-ecological relations and their 
dominant development dynamics that we have proposed here might 
help to evaluate possible multi-dimensional transformative alternatives 
to extractivism. This includes, most importantly, necessary changes 
in international rules and regulations, but also in social and political 
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institutions, socio-technical configurations, societal-nature relations, 
and prevailing symbolic orientations such as conceptions of progress, 
freedom, and growth (Brand and Wissen, in press). One final import-
ant point to make is that such social-ecological transformation would 
necessarily require addressing social practices in the capitalist centers, 
including countries such as China as a field of innovation, in order to 
overcome the social relations underlying the still predominant imperi-
alist mode of living. One implication of this, for example, would be the 
need to de-naturalize access to cheap and unsustainably produced com-
modities and labor power. 
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